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Abstract. Over the past decade, smartphones have become the point of conver-
gence for many applications and services. There is a growing trend in which tra-
ditional smart-card based services like banking, transport and access control are
being provisioned through smartphones. Smartphones with Near Field Communi-
cation (NFC) capability can emulate a contactless smart card; popular examples
of such services include Google Pay and Apple Pay. Similar to contactless smart
cards, NFC-based smartphone transactions are susceptible to relay attacks. For
contactless smart cards, distance-bounding protocols are proposed to counter such
attacks; for NFC-based smartphone transactions, ambient sensors have been pro-
posed as potential countermeasures. In this study, we have empirically evaluated
the suitability of ambient sensors as a proximity detection mechanism for con-
tactless transactions. To provide a comprehensive analysis, we also collected relay
attack data to ascertain whether ambient sensors are able to thwart such attacks
effectively. We initially evaluated 17 sensors before selecting 7 sensors for in-depth
analysis based on their effectiveness as potential proximity detection mechanisms
within the constraints of a contactless transaction scenario. Each sensor was used
to record 1000 legitimate and relay (illegitimate) contactless transactions at four
different physical locations. The analysis of these transactions provides an empir-
ical foundation on which to determine whether ambient sensors provide a strong
proximity detection mechanism for security-sensitive applications like banking,
transport and high-security access control.
1 Introduction
Near Field Communication (NFC) [13] has opened smartphone platforms to many differ-
ent application domains, particularly smart cards. By enabling a smartphone to emulate
a contactless smart card, users may use a mobile device as a potential replacement for
smart cards in applications such as banking, transport and access control. Leading tech-
nology firms, particularly Google and Apple, have already launched smartphone-based
payment services. To this end, the Android platform has proposed Host-based Card Em-
ulation (HCE) [29] that is poised to open up card emulation via NFC to any application
on an Android smartphone.
Mobile (contactless) payments are being adopted by tech-savvy, young age groups
[10]. Deloitte predicted that 5% of the 600-650 million NFC-enabled mobile phones would
be used at least once a month in 20151 to make a contactless payment [8]. We can rea-
sonably assume, therefore, that mobile payments will be a significant payment medium
1 Actual figures for 2015 were not available at the time of writing this paper. However, early
forecasts for the global market in mobile payments for 2016 and beyond are available at
http://www.nfcworld.com/technology/forecast/
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in the future, potentially overtaking contactless smart cards. According to Statista, in
2015, 12.7% of smartphone users in the USA were actively using proximity mobile pay-
ment and the value of such transactions is projected to grow to 114 billion US$ by
20182. Although this discussion is limited to the financial industry, similar trends are
being observed in other domains where contactless smart cards are deployed [4].
A relay attack is a passive man-in-the-middle attack in which an attacker extends the
distance between a genuine payment terminal (point-of-service) and a genuine contactless
smart card (or NFC-enabled mobile device). This attack can enable a malicious user to
access services for which the genuine user is eligible, such as paying for goods or accessing
a building with physical access controls. Smart card and smartphone-based contactless
transactions are susceptible to relay attacks. Such attacks on contactless smart cards
have been extensively studied in the literature [15, 16, 20, 23]. With the advent of NFC
technology to emulate a smart card, relay attacks were demonstrated to be successful
in [17, 18, 33]. To counter such attacks, ambient sensors available on smartphones are
being proposed [19,24,27,28,30,32] as strong candidates.
In this investigation, we carried out an empirical study that included both legitimate
and illegitimate transaction data. Legitimate data was collected from two devices that
were in close proximity (<3cm) to each other, whereas illegitimate data was collected
from two devices that were 5ft (1.5m) apart. This provided real data, collected from our
field trials, to analyse ambient sensor data for devices that are both in proximity to each
other and at a distance. The primary contributions of this paper include:
– Evaluation Test-bed: We established a reproducible3 test-bed environment that was
used to collect field data for legitimate and illegitimate transactions concurrently at
a single point in time ‘Timei’. For detailed discussion of the theoretical model and
its practical implementation, see section 3.
– Proximity Detection Analysis: The suitability of a proximity detection mechanism
for critical applications, such as banking, transport and high-security access control,
is based on its ability to uniquely pair measurements taken from a payment terminal
and a payment instrument (or mobile handset in this case). This is to provide confi-
dence that the two devices were truly in close proximity (≈ 3cm) to each other. The
measurements should be taken within 500ms as mandated by the EMV specifica-
tions that govern contactless transactions for the banking sector [5–7,9,11]. Section
4.2 discusses the analysis results for both the proximity detection and effectiveness
analysis.
– Effectiveness Analysis Against Relay Attacks: The effectiveness of an ambient sensor
in countering a relay attack was studied using the illegitimate transaction data. An
effective ambient sensor should be able to reject sensor values that were recorded
from two devices further than 3cm from each other, while still accepting all legitimate
transactions. In our experiments, we selected a distance of 5ft (1.5m) between the
devices; at this realistic distance the ambient sensor should be able to perform well
as anti-relay countermeasure.
2 Statista website: http://www.statista.com/statistics/244475/proximity-mobile-
payment-transaction-value-in-the-united-states/
3 Test-bed implementation and data collected from the field trials would be made public on
project website anonymous
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2 Ambient Sensors in Mobile-NFC Transactions
In this section, we briefly discuss NFC-based smartphone transactions and how relay
attacks are carried out. Subsequently, we discuss ambient sensor deployment to avoid
such attacks.
2.1 Relay Attacks on Contactless Transactions
In an NFC-based mobile contactless transaction, a mobile handset is brought into the
radio frequency range (<3cm) of a payment terminal through which it can initiate a
dialogue. During a contactless transaction, physical contact is not necessary and, in
many cases, a second factor of authentication, e.g. biometrics or Personal Identification
Number (PIN), is not required [11]. This makes it difficult to ascertain whether the
genuine or relay device is in close proximity of the terminal. It should be noted, however,
that the use of a PIN or biometric may not counter a relay attack effectively in certain
situations (notably the Mafia fraud attack [14]).
Fig. 1. Overview of a Relay Attack
In a relay attack [17,18,33], shown in Figure 1, an attacker must present a malicious
payment terminal to a genuine user and a masquerading payment instrument (mobile
phone) to a genuine payment terminal. The goal of the malicious actor is to extend
the physical distance of the communication channel between the victim’s mobile phone
and the payment terminal – relaying each message across this extended distance. The
attacker has the potential to gain access to services using the victim’s account if it
successfully relays messages without detection.
2.2 Ambient Sensors: Single Sensor, Single Tap Proximity Detection
A substantial portion of the work surrounding relay-attack countermeasures for contact-
less smart cards relates to distance bounding protocols [12,14–16,21,26]. However, these
may not be feasible for NFC-enabled phones – at the current state of the art – due to
their requirement of high time-delay sensitivity and specialised hardware [13,19]. Thus,
several methods have been proposed to provide some notion of proximity detection for
NFC-based contactless mobile transactions, most of which use environmental (ambient)
sensors present on modern mobile handsets (for related work see Section 5.1). In the
following section, we discuss how ambient sensors have been proposed to counter relay
attacks in NFC-based mobile contactless transactions.
An ambient sensor measures a particular physical/environmental property of its im-
mediate surroundings, such as temperature, light or sound; modern smartphones and
tablets are equipped with one or more of these sensors. The physical environment sur-
rounding a smartphone (or a payment terminal) can potentially provide a rich set of
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Fig. 2. Generic Deployment of Ambient Sensors as Proximity Detection Mechanisms
attributes that may be unique to that location – the sound and lighting of a quiet,
brightly-lit room, for example – and such information may be crucial for proximity
detection between two interacting devices.
In this section, we discuss a generic approach for deploying ambient sensing as a
proximity detection mechanism that can be used in the context of mobile payments.
Figure 2 illustrates the entities involved in this process. Variations of this approach are
discussed below:
1. Independent Reporting. In this scenario, depicted as solid lines in Figure 2, both
the smartphone and payment terminal collect sensor measurements independently
of each other and transmit these to a trusted authority. This authority compares
the sensor measurements, based on some predefined comparison algorithm with set
margins of error (threshold), and decides whether the two devices are in proximity
to each other.
2. Payment Terminal Dependent Reporting. This setup, depicted as double-dot-
dash lines in Figure 2, involves the smartphone encrypting the sensor measurements
with a shared key (between smart phone and trusted authority) and transmitting
the encrypted message to the payment terminal. The payment terminal sends its
own measurements and the smartphone’s to the trusted authority for comparison.
3. Payment Terminal (Localised) Evaluation. The smartphone transmits its own
measurement to the payment terminal, which then compares it with its own mea-
surements locally; the payment terminal then decides whether the smartphone is in
close proximity.
Regardless of how the user interacts with the payment terminal, e.g. touching or
tapping it with their device, the overall deployment architecture falls under one of the
above scenarios. It can be observed that there is a potential for a fourth scenario in
which smartphone (payment instrument) could perform the comparison. We assume
in this paper, however, that smartphones might be in control of malicious users due to
which we ignored this scenario. In this study, our sole focus is on a single tap-single sensor
deployment; the evaluation framework of such a deployment is discussed in subsequent
sections.
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3 Evaluation Framework for Single Sensor – Single Tap
In this section, we discuss the theoretical evaluation framework and provide the rationale
behind the setup of the data collection platform (part of the Evaluation Test-bed). We
describe how data was collected and analysed in subsequent sections.
3.1 Evaluation Framework: A Theoretical Model
As mentioned previously, we aim to analyse the effectiveness of ambient sensors, not only
in proximity detection but also in their ability to counter relay attacks. Towards this
goal, a test environment must be devised in which we can collect both legitimate and
illegitimate pairs of ambient sensor measurements. A genuine pair of sensor measure-
ments are from two devices that are physically in close proximity to each other (<3cm).
An illegitimate pair is from two devices that are not physically in close proximity, and
in the context of this paper we consider this distance to be 5ft (1.5m).
To achieve this, we combine a genuine transaction framework, as shown in Figure 1,
and a relay attack framework (Figure 2) in such a way that we have both the genuine
pair and illegitimate pair measurements at some transaction time interval ‘Timei’. The
constraint of time to ‘Timei’ is imposed because ambient sensor values may change
depending upon the location and time at which the transaction was carried out. To
avoid any discrepancies introduced because of the dependence of ambient sensors on
location and time, we collected these pairs concurrently. This also helps us understand
how different the sensor measurements would be at the time of transaction ‘Timei’, from
a close proximity device (<3cm) and distant device (5ft).
Transaction 
Instrument 
(TI)
Transaction 
Terminal 
(TT)
Trusted Authority
TI Sensor Measurement
TT Sensor Measurement
Distant 
Transaction 
Instrument (DTI)
DTI Sensor Measurement
Fig. 3. Overview of Test-bed – Trial Data Collection Platform
Figure 3 shows our data collection setup. The Transaction Terminal (TT) is a static
device, and we use this as a reference point for our two pairs. The Transaction Instrument
(TI) is a mobile phone in close proximity to the TT at time ‘Timei’ and the ambient
sensor measurement pair TT-TI is referred to as the genuine pair. Another mobile phone,
at a 5ft (1.5m) distance from the TT, is referred to as the Distant Transaction Instru-
ment (DTI). The ambient sensor measurement pair TT-DTI taken at time ‘Timei’ is
referred to as the illegitimate pair. The rationale for setting up the test environment
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in this manner is to collect ambient sensor values from proximate and distant devices
simultaneously. If, for a transaction ‘Ti’, the genuine pair is uniquely identified (and ac-
cepted) then the ambient sensor is considered effective. However, if the illegitimate pair
is accepted (whether uniquely or along with the genuine pair) then the relay attack on
that ‘Ti’ is successful. The reasoning is that if two devices at 5ft (1.5m) apart measure
ambient sensors independently, and the illegitimate pair is indistinguishable from a gen-
uine pair, then the attacker can successfully relay messages between these two devices
without being detected.
At a point in time, the beginning of Timei, a user taps TI to TT; at this point, DTI
also initiates the ambient sensor measurements along with TI and TT. Thus, at Timei,
we have three separate ambient sensor measurements for the three devices. We acquired
the ground truth of genuine and illegitimate pairs as the transactions were conducted
with the help of volunteers from the university in a monitored environment. Overall, for
an ambient sensor to be effective, the Trusted Authority should be able to distinguish the
genuine pair from the illegitimate pair. To evaluate each ambient sensors effectiveness
for proximity detection and to detect relay attacks, we analysed the collected data using
two methods:
Evaluation Method 1 - Proximity Detection In this analysis, we considered only
the genuine pairs (TT-TI) of ambient sensor measurements, based on this empirically
collected data from field trials at four different locations on the university campus. We
calculated the threshold, t, which would then be used by entities such as the Trusted
Authority (in Figure 3) to make the decision about whether devices participating in
a transaction are proximate to each other or not. Based on this t, we evaluated how
many of the transactions represented by genuine pairs would be accepted or not. This
analysis provides quantitative results demonstrating the accuracy of ambient sensors for
proximity detection using only TT-TI pairs.
Evaluation Method 2 - Inclusion of Attack Vector Next, we included the ambient
sensor measurements taken by DTI – a device that is 5ft (1.5m) away from the TT. We
then recomputed these t values (from Evaluation Method 1) using data included from
DTI, and evaluated whether the illegitimate pair (TT-DTI) would be accepted as a
genuine pair, while considering TT-TI pairs as legitimate. This analysis provided the
success and failure rates of a potential relay attack for a particular ambient sensor,
while also judging the rate at which legitimate transactions are rejected/accepted.
3.2 Test-bed Architecture
As mentioned in Section 3.1, three devices were used in the data collection phase, TT,
TI and DTI. A distinct application was developed to assist in data collection, which was
then installed on each of the three devices. During the experimental phase, the devices
TT and DTI were placed on tables at a distance of 5ft (1.5m) from one another. Both
devices (TT and DTI) were placed on stands facing the same direction.
When TI was brought in close proximity to TT, an NFC connection between the two
devices would be established, initiated by TT, indicating the beginning of a transaction.
According to the EMV standard, TT and TI should be in proximity, less than 3cm
apart [11]. Device TT would then immediately broadcast a message on the local network,
to be received by device DTI, notifying it of the transaction initiation process. All three
devices would then record values from a predefined ambient sensor for 500ms and then
store it in a local database file. Figure 4 depicts the test-bed architecture.
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Fig. 4. Test-bed Architecture
3.3 Data Collection Implementation Platform and Specifications
Three Samsung Galaxy S4 (GT-I9500) Android devices running on Android 5.0.1 were
used in the experimental phase, with all extraneous synchronisation services and appli-
cations disabled. This specific device was found to include a large variety of sensors,
covering the majority of sensors supported by the Android platform [2], excluding the
Geomagnetic Rotation Vector. An overview of each sensor is provided in Appendix A.
Table 1 lists the available sensors on the device, the ones used in our experiments
and the rational behind excluding some. For the majority of excluded sensors, no values
could be captured in the 500ms timeframe. With the exception of the proximity sensor,
additional time is required for these sensors in order to return data. According to [3],
less than 5% of the time any data is being returned by the Bluetooth, GPS, Network
Location and WiFi sensors. Additionally, we evaluated the Ambient Temperature and
Relative Humidity sensors, and discovered that data was also returned less than 5% of
the time when recorded for 500ms, for 50 repetitions. The proximity sensor on Samsung
Galaxy S4 returns only a true or false value when the sensor, located in the front of the
device, is covered or uncovered, hence it could not be used e↵ectively in the experimental
phase. Lastly, the sound sensor, i.e. the microphone, of the specific device was tested;
we found that this could not initiate and record values within 500ms. For our analysis
we used the 7 best sensors and discarded the others.
Android applications Three Android applications were developed for TT, TI and
DTI. The application built for device TT included two connection interfaces. The first
interface, used for the NFC connection with the device TI, device TT was set to NFC
reader mode, allowing it to interact with discovered NFC tags. The second, used for
connection with the device DTI, device TT would broadcast a UDP packet in the local
network, setting the destination port to 8888. The application running on device TI,
in order to achieve NFC connection with TT, was using Host-based Card Emulation
(HCE) [1]. HCE allows Android-powered devices to act as contactless smart-cards and
interact with NFC readers. Finally, the application running on device DTI featured a
broadcast listener, listening on network port 8888 for UDP packets from TT. The source
code of the three applications is available at https://anonymised.com/.
When TI was brought into proximity with TT, the former would send a message to
the first via NFC. This message consisted by a random 7-byte transaction ID, generated
by the device TT and used to uniquely identify each transaction during the analysis
phase, and the sensor to be recorded in the current transaction. Following the transmis-
sion of the message to TI, device TT would broadcast the same message to the wireless
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Table 1. Sensor Availability for Samsung Galaxy S4
Sensors Supported Used Reason
Accelerometer 3 3 -
Gravity 3 3 -
Gyroscope 3 3 -
Light 3 3 -
Linear Acceleration 3 3 -
Magnetic Field 3 3 -
Rotation Vector 3 3 -
Ambient Temperature 3 7 Not enough values in timeframe.
Bluetooth 3 7 Not enough values in timeframe.
GPS 3 7 Not enough values in timeframe.
Relative Humidity 3 7 Not enough values in timeframe.
Network Location 3 7 Not enough values in timeframe.
Pressure 3 7 Not mature for data collection.
Proximity 3 7 Not enough values in timeframe.
Sound 3 7 Not enough values in timeframe.
WiFi 3 7 Not enough values in timeframe.
GRV† 7 7 Not present. Used Rotation Vector instead.
†Geomagnetic Rotation Vector
local area network. Devices TT and DTI were connected to the same wireless hotspot,
created for the requirements of the experiment. No other devices were connected on the
hotspot. The device DTI would then capture the message by listening for broadcast
UDP packets with destination port 8888. The two devices, TI and DTI, would start
recording data for a period of 500ms, using the sensor specified in the message that they
received from TT, upon receiving it. Device TT would initiate the recording process, for
the same amount of time and using the same sensor immediately after sending the two
messages. This is done so that the three devices initiate the recording process as close
to each other as possible.
On the Android operating system, data captured by a sensor are returned to an
application in time intervals set by the application. The rate at which data was polled
from the sensors was set at the highest available rate supported by the devices. The
highest available rate was the same across all three devices, as they shared the same
hardware and software. By default, the operating system only returns data values when
the values alter.
Following the recording time period, device TI would send a response message, con-
taining the transaction ID and sensor, to TT. The former would then validate that the
two devices were on the same transaction and recording the same sensor, and in case
of inconsistencies would not store data for the specific transaction. After validation,
the three devices would then store the recorded data in a local SQLite database, along
with the transaction ID, sequence number, timestamp and the pre-defined location in
which the recording took place. Separate database tables were used for each sensor. The
recorded data was stored in XML format. During the data analysis phase, only transac-
tions that existed in all three databases, based on their transaction ID were considered.
An overview of the measurement recording across the three devices is presented in
Figure 5. After the recording of a measurement, device TT would automatically switch
to the next sensor in the list of examined sensors and wait for a new transaction to be
initiated.
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WiFi: sensor|transaction ID
recordSensor()recordSensor() recordSensor()
NFC: 2) sensor|transaction ID
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saveMeasurement()
Fig. 5. Measurement Recording Overview
For the data collection, student volunteers were requested to participate in the trails.
A total of 1000 transactions were collected for each sensor, distributed in 4 distinct
locations on the university campus. Individual volunteer was asked to tap the device TI
to TT, while at the same time another volunteer was tapping a dummy device to DTI.
4 Evaluating Ambient Sensors for Proximity Detection
In line with the framework discussed previously, we conducted a two-fold evaluation
using the sensor data collected during field trials:
– Evaluation Method 1: The success/failure rates for correctly identifying the two
legitimate devices in a transaction were determined (transaction instrument, TI, and
terminal, TT ). That is, given a set of transactions T, with each transaction com-
prising a triple of TI, terminal and distant instrument (DTI) sensor measurements,
i.e. Ti = (TIi, TTi, DTIi), can TIi and TTi be identified as belonging to transaction
i. All TI values were compared with with all values of TT in a |T| ⇥ |T| matrix.
We aim to generate a threshold, t, that accepts all valid pairs, i.e. (TIi, TTj), i = j,
while rejecting those which are invalid: (TIi, TTj), i 6= j.
– Evaluation Method 2: The rates of the distant device being accepted as legiti-
mately co-located with the terminal, i.e. whether DTIi is accepted incorrectly as
a legitimate TI measurement with the terminal TTi despite being 5ft (1.5m) away.
This way, the success/failure rate of a relay attack being conducted successfully can
be determined in the presence of ambient sensing. We generate new thresholds that
maximise the number of legitimate transactions, i.e. (TIi, TTi), while minimising
the number of accepted transactions conducted from afar between (DTIi, TTi).
4.1 Transaction Data Analysis
In this section, we describe how the data analysis was conducted.
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legitimate devices in a transaction were determined (transaction instrument, TI, and
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prising a triple of TI, terminal and distant instrument (DTI) sensor measurements,
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be determined in the presence of ambient sensing. We generate new thresholds that
maximise the number of legitimate transactions, i.e. (TIi, TTi), while minimising
the number of accepted transactions conducted from afar between (DTIi, TTi).
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4.1 Transaction Data Analysis
In this section, we describe how the data analysis was conducted.
Sensor Measurement Similarity To determine whether the sensor measurements of
TIi and DTIi were in proximity with TTi, two metrics were employed to judge the simi-
larity between, firstly, TIi and TTi for Evaluation 1, and (TIi, TTi) and (DTTIi, Ti) for
Evaluation 2. Specifically, we used the Mean Absolute Error and Pearson’s Correlation
Coefficient, as used in [25], which are given in Eqs. 1 and 2 respectively.
MAE(Ai, Bi) =
1
N
N∑
j=0
|Ai,j −Bi,j | (1)
Where N refers to the number of datapoints in a sensor measurement, and Ai,j refers
to the jth datapoint of the ith sensor measurement on device A.
corr(Ai, Bi) =
cov(Ai, Bi)
σAi · σBi
(2)
Where σAi denotes the standard deviation of the sensor measurements of Ai, and cov
represents the covariance, given below in Eq. 3, with µAi denoting the mean of Ai.
cov(Ai, Bi) =
1
N
N∑
j=0
(Ai,j − µAi)(Bi,j − µBi) (3)
M =
√
x2 + y2 + z2 (4)
Pre-processing All sensors except those for light produce a vector of values consisting
of x, y and z components. For these sensors, the vector magnitude (Eq. 4) was used
as a general-purpose method for producing a single, combined value prior to comput-
ing the MAE and correlation coefficient. In the event that the sensor values exceeded
the maximum permitted transaction time (500ms), such values were discarded prior to
computing the similarity. Moreover, any sensor values on device A that were recorded
after the maximum time recorded by device B were also discarded. This was to prevent
undefined results when computing MAE; calculating |Ai,j −Bi,j | is undefined when Ai,j
has no corresponding datapoint on device B, i.e. Bi,j .
Related to this was the issue of irregular sampling rates; usually, sensor values of
device A did not map to exactly the same times as those recorded on B. That is, Ai,3
may have been collected at 15ms from the start, while Bi,3 was recorded at 22ms. This
time discrepancy will have some impact on the results, particularly if the number of
recorded datapoints is small and the time difference is large. Hence, to mitigate this,
linear interpolation was performed on both sets of datapoints to establish a consistent
sampling rate of 10ms before computing either similarity metric. We summarise the data
analysis workflow in Figure 6.
4.2 Calculating FPR, FNR and EER
To perform Evaluation 1 and 2, we computed Equal Error Rates (EERs) to determine
optimal similarities/thresholds where the rate of false positives (FPR) is equal to the
rate of false negatives for each tested sensor. The following notions of true positives
(TPs) and negatives (TNs), false positives (FPs) and negatives (FNs) are defined for
each evaluation:
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Fig. 6. Pre-processing and similarity workflow for a Magnetic Field-based transaction using
MAE (left to right): (a) Sensor data acquisition from all three devices, (b) Perform linear
interpolation and truncation, (c) Measure MAE between terminal and distant device (shaded
area) and terminal and transaction instrument (checkered region).
– Evaluation 1. TP: TIi is paired with the correct, corresponding TTi. TN: TIi and
TTj (i 6= j) is rejected correctly. FP: TIi and TTj is accepted as belonging to the
same transaction. FN: TIi and TTj is rejected, despite belonging to the same trans-
action.
– Evaluation 2. TP: the legitimate transaction instrument-terminal pair (TIi, TTi)
is accepted correctly. TN: the distant instrument-terminal pair, (DTIi, TTi), is re-
jected correctly. FP: the distant-terminal pair is wrongly accepted as a legitimate
transaction. FN: the legitimate transaction instrument-terminal pair is rejected in-
correctly.
In order to determine an optimal similarity threshold to balance the security and
usability of each sensor, 100 thresholds – between the minimum and maximum observed
distances for MAE and [−1, 1] for correlation – were tested for each similarity metric.
The FPR and FNR were measured at each threshold using Eqs. 5 and 6. Here, a thresh-
old is the maximum permitted difference in similarity before a transaction is rejected;
conversely, a transaction is accepted if the similarity in device sensor measurements is
within this threshold. Ideally, a chosen threshold for a real-world deployment should
reject all illegitimate transactions, namely those between the distant instrument and the
terminal, while accepting all legitimate transactions between the transaction instrument
and terminal. In our analysis, the EERs and associated thresholds for each sensor are
calculated for both of the similarity metrics described in Section 4.1.
TPR =
TP
TP + FN
TNR =
TN
TN + FP
(5)
FPR = 1− TNR FNR = 1− TPR (6)
Figure 7 shows the FPR/FNR graph produced for 100 different thresholds using
the Gyroscope sensor and Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient. By inspection, the point at
which FNR and FPR intersect (FNR=FPR) has a corresponding EER of approximately
42% for this sensor and similarity metric.
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Fig. 7. Example Gyroscope FPR-FNR curves using correlation for Evaluation 2.
4.3 Individual Sensor Results
In this section, we present the number of TPs, FPs and EERs for each sensor and for
both similarity metrics described in Section 4.1. The results of Evaluation 1 – the rate
at which the transaction instrument and terminal pairs can be correctly identified from
sensor data – are presented below in Table 2.
Table 2. Optimum Thresholds and EERs for Evaluation 1
Sensors
Optimum
EERMAE
Optimum
EERcorr
ThresholdMAE Thresholdcorr
Accelerometer 0.607 0.650 0.020 0.591
Gyroscope 0.369 0.551 0.510 0.520
Magnetic Field 88.07 0.505 0.020 0.511
Rotation Vector 3.02e-08 0.587 0.061 0.508
Gravity 8.57-07 0.507 0.061 0.501
Light 230.9 0.583 0.020 0.514
Linear Acceleration 0.589 0.513 -0.020 0.572
Next, for Evaluation 2, new thresholds are generated that now consider the distant
instrument–terminal pair, outlined in the beginning of this section. The results – the rate
at which distant instrument and legitimate transactions are accepted and denied – are
presented in Table 3. A more detailed breakdown of the absolute number of TPs, TNs,
FPs and FNs of Evaluation 2 is presented in Table 4, which are generated using the EER
threshold. The rate of accepted transactions using the distant instrument – analogous
to the rate of successful relay attacks – can be found by reading the EER directly. By
definition, the EER is the point at which FPR=FNR, and FPR are equivalent to the
proportion of successful distant transactions (FPs) to the total of FPs and correctly
denied distant transactions (TNs). Hence, the rate of potentially successful relay attacks
(FPR) is equal to the EER, which we present in Table 3. We estimate, for example,
that using the accelerometer with MAE will result in 55.8% relayed transactions being
accepted.
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Table 3. Optimum Thresholds and EERs for Evaluation 2
Sensors
Optimum
EERMAE
Optimum
EERcorr
ThresholdMAE Thresholdcorr
Accelerometer 0.509 0.558 0.013 0.523
Gyroscope 0.166 0.776 0.722 0.444
Magnetic Field 88.12 0.389 0.038 0.512
Rotation Vector 2.961 0.522 0.063 0.547
Gravity 1.00e-06 0.430 0.089 0.492
Light 25.13 0.739 0.089 0.492
Linear Acceleration 0.516 0.632 -0.013 0.453
Table 4. Breakdown of TPs, TNs, FPs and FNs for Evaluation 2
Sensor MAE TPs TNs FPs FNs Corr TPs TNs FPs FNs
Accelerometer 497 406 512 421 539 438 480 379
Gyroscope 230 227 787 784 620 564 450 394
Magnetic Field 630 618 390 378 511 492 516 497
Rotation Vector 534 486 530 482 509 460 556 507
Gravity 757 579 437 259 593 516 500 423
Light 310 267 755 712 560 547 475 462
Linear Acceleration 438 375 644 581 598 557 462 421
4.4 Analysis Equipment
Both analyses were conducted on an Ubuntu-based machine equipped with an eight-core
Intel Xeon E5-2407 CPU (2.20GHz) and 8GB RAM. The data analysis applications were
developed in Python, using the NumPy [31] library for general numerical computation
and handling, and SciPy [22] for implementations of Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient
and linear interpolation. Overall, Evaluation 1 took a total of 9.5 hours to complete,
including the pre-computation of 8000 × 8000 transactions for each similarity metric,
while Evaluation 2 was performed in 304.5 seconds – both of which were timed within
the Python scripts.
5 Outcome and Future Directions
The results we present provide an empirical foundation for evaluating various mobile
sensors as proximity detection and anti-relay mechanisms for NFC-based mobile trans-
actions. As discussed in the methodology of Evaluation 1, the higher the EER, the
greater the likelihood that a genuine transaction is rejected when readings between the
terminal and transaction instrument are considered. Next, based on Evaluation 2, we
investigated the success rate of a potential relay attack by considering readings between
the terminal–distant instrument and the terminal–transaction instrument. The EER
columns in Table 3 presents the potential success rate of a relay attack. Here, it can
be observed that the Magnetic Field sensor performs relatively better with 38.9% relay
attack success. This is compared with the EER for the Gyroscope sensor, which has a
77.6% possibility of a successful relay attack taking place – one of the highest in our
analysis. However, not only does the EER denote the potential success of a relay attack,
but also the potential of a legitimate transactions being denied. The aforementioned
Magnetic Field EER indicates that 38.9% of relay attacks would be accepted and 38.9%
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legitimate transactions would be denied. While a high number, the rejection rate for
legitimate transactions for the same sensor without DTI was 50.5% (Evaluation 1, Table
2). Therefore proximity detection improved when taking relay attack data into account;
this was the case for all other sensors except Gyroscope, Light and Linear Acceleration.
Nevertheless, the best performing sensor (Magnetic Field with MAE) still had a
significantly high EER (0.389). Denying over 1-in-3 legitimate transactions would in-
variably cause annoyance issues for users in practice. Hence, based on our results, it is
difficult to recommend any of the sensors for a single tap-single sensor deployment for
high security applications, such as banking. These sensors, however, might be appropri-
ate for low-security access control, but we recommend that a thorough analysis of the
sensors and their performance in the chosen domain is performed prior to deployment.
One potential reason that related research (discussed in section 5.1) in this domain
has achieved different results is due to the larger sampling duration and limited field
trials in other work. The sample duration limit imposed during our experiments was in
line with the performance requirements of an EMV application, i.e. 500 milliseconds.
Additionally, transportation is one of the biggest application areas for contactless smart
cards, along with banking; in this domain, the recommended duration for transactions
is far lower, in the range of 300-400 milliseconds. Imposing a limit of 500 millisecond in
our experiments, therefore, was based on the upper bound of the recommendations of
two significant application areas where contactless mobile phones might be utilised.
As part of our ongoing research, we are currently experimenting with:
– Can we simultaneously measure multiple sensors within the transaction time dura-
tion? If so, will it reduce the risk associated with these sensors individually?
– Combining sensor measurements with time slices: only one sensor is measured at a
time, but over the duration of the transaction multiple sensors could be used.
– Is a location-specific deployment feasible? And will it improve the success rate sig-
nificantly if such an approach is adopted?
5.1 Related Work
As noted previously, distance bounding protocols might not be suitable for mobile-based
contactless transactions. In existing work, therefore, ambient sensors have been proposed
as a strong proximity detection mechanism to counter relay attacks, which is discussed
below.
Drimer et al. [15] and Ma et al. [24] showed how location-related data, using a GPS
(Global Positioning System), can be used to determine the proximity of two NFC mobile
phones. Ma et al. used a ten second window with location information collected every
second, which was subsequently compared across various devices. The authors reported
a high success rate in identifying the devices in close proximity to one another.
Halevi et al. [19] demonstrated the suitability of using ambient sound and light for
proximity detection. Here, the authors analysed the sensor measurements – collected for
2 and 30 seconds duration for light and audio respectively – using a range of similar-
ity comparison algorithms. Extensive experiments were performed in different physical
locations, with a high success rate in detecting co-located devices.
Varshavsky et al. [32] based their proximity detection mechanism on the shared
radio environment of devices – the presence of WiFi access points and associated signal
strengths – using the application scenario of secure device pairing. In this work, they
considered this approach to produce low error rates, recommending it as a proximity
detection mechanism. While their paper did not focus on NFC-based mobile transactions,
their techniques and methodology may still be applicable.
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Table 5. Related Work in Sensors as Anti-Relay Mechanism
Paper Sensor(s) Used Sample Duration Contactless Suitability
Ma et al. [24] GPS 10 seconds Unlikely
Halevi et al. [19] Audio 30 seconds Unlikely
Light 2 seconds More Likely
Varshavsky et al. [32] WiFi (Radio Waves) 1 second More Likely
Urien et al. [30] Temperature N/A -
Mehrnezhad et al. [25] Accelerometer 0.6 to 1.5 Seconds More Likely
Thruong et al. [28] GPS Raw Data 120 seconds Unlikely
Wifi 30 seconds Unlikely
Ambient Audio 10 seconds Unlikely
Bluetooth 12 seconds Unlikely
Shrestha et al. [27] Temparture (T) Few seconds Unlikely
Precision Gas (G) Few seconds Unlikely
Humidity (H) Few seconds Unlikely
Altitude (A) Few seconds Unlikely
HA Few seconds Unlikely
HGA Few seconds Unlikely
THGA Few seconds Unlikely
Urien et al. [30] used ambient temperature with an elliptic curve-based RFID and/or
NFC authentication protocol to determine whether two devices were co-located. Using
this method, they were successful in establishing a secure channel; the proposal com-
bines the timing channels in RFID, traditionally used in distance bounding protocols, in
conjunction with ambient temperature. Their proposal, however, was not implemented
and so there is no experimental data provided to evaluate its efficacy.
Mehrnezhad et al. [25] proposed the use of an accelerometer to provide assurance that
the mobile phone is within the vicinity of the payment terminal. Their proposal requires
the user to tap the payment terminal twice in succession, after which the sensor streams
of the device and the payment terminal are compared for similarity. It is difficult to
deduce the total time it took to complete one transaction in its entirety, but the authors
have provided a sensor recording time range of 0.6–1.5 seconds.
Thruong et al. [28] evaluated four different sensors. Similarly to previous studies, their
sample rates were 10-120 seconds. Although results were positive, the sample duration
made them unsuitable for NFC-based mobile transactions. Shrestha et al. [27] used
specialised hardware known as Sensordrone, with a number of ambient sensors, but
did not evaluate the commodity ambient sensors available on commercial handsets, did
not provide the sample duration, and only mentioned that data from each sensor was
collected for a few seconds. This potentially renders the technique inapplicable to NFC-
based mobile transactions.
We summarise the related work in Table 5, and use sensor sampling durations to
determine whether a given approach is suitable for contactless NFC mobile phone trans-
actions, namely in banking and transportation. ‘Possibly not’ are those proposals whose
sample duration is so large that they may not be adequate for mobile-based services
that substitute contactless cards, whereas those whose sample range can be considered
reasonable in certain applications are labelled as ‘More Likely’ in the Table 5. However,
even schemes denoted as ‘More Likely’ may not be suitable for certain domains, such
as banking or transport applications, where a strict upper-bound is often present in
which to complete the entire transaction. In these domains, the goal is to serve people
as quickly as possible to maximise customer throughput, so time is critical in determin-
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ing whether a transaction is successful and, indeed, permitted. An optimum transaction
duration is 500 milliseconds, rather than seconds as discussed in previous sections.
The use of ambient sensors for proximity detection in NFC-based mobile services is
expanding, as illustrated by the number of proposals that currently exist. In this paper
we extended the discussion to a large set of ambient sensors and included real-world relay
attack data – not only analysing their effectiveness as proximity detection mechanism
but also as a strong anti-relay mechanism. Table 1 shows that we have undertaken
a comprehensive evaluation of ambient sensors for proximity detection and anti-relay
effectiveness. A point to note is that in previous literature, ambient sensors were not
evaluated for their effectiveness as a anti-relay mechanism (Table 5). Without a strong
ability to detect relay attacks, the proximity detection alone does not warrant their
deployment as an effective mechanism in NFC based mobile transactions.
6 Conclusion
The aim of this investigation was to evaluate and analyse a range of sensors present in
modern day off-the-shelf mobile devices, and to determine which sensors, if any, would be
suitable as proximity detection and anti-relay mechanisms in the domain of NFC mobile
phone transactions. We shortlisted 17 sensors accessible through the Google Android
platform, before limiting the investigation to those which were widely available and
shown promising results in our initial trails. In the existing literature, only 12 sensors
have been proposed as effective proximity detection mechanisms, as listed in Table 5.
Some of these sensors are only available in specialised ambient sensor hardware and in
almost all instances no relay attack data was collected to determine their effectiveness
against such attacks. In this study, we implemented and evaluated 7 sensors and collected
data representing a genuine transactions and a malicious transaction (from actual relay
attacks). The objective of collecting these two separate set of data at the same time
was to empirical evaluate the implemented sensors with high degree of objectivity. We
have also shown that detection rate improves for legitimate transactions if the optimum
thresholds are generated from data including relay attack data – however, even with this
improvement the overall results were not promising. The data collection was carried out
with the help of student volunteers at four different locations on university campus with
varied ambient conditions. The scope of our analysis focused on NFC-enabled mobile
devices that emulate traditional smart card services, such as transportation and banking.
Within this scope, we have shown that non of the evaluated sensors at their current stage
are effective against relay attacks – a major point used to justify their application by
existing literature.
We will make the source code for our test-bed publicly available, along with our
collected data sets, for open scrutiny and further analysis.
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A Ambient Sensors
This appendix provides a short description of each sensor.
A.1 Accelerometer
The accelerometer sensor – deployed in most modern smartphones – measures the ac-
celeration applied to the device on the x, y and z axes; its units are metres per second
per second (ms−2).
A.2 Ambient Temperature
The ambient temperature sensor returns the room temperature in Celsius degrees (◦C).
A.3 Bluetooth
Bluetooth is a technology that facilitates wireless communication and operates in the
ISM band centred at 2.4 gigahertz. As a proximity sensor, we measure the Bluetooth
devices in the vicinity (their names and MAC addresses).
A.4 Geomagnetic Rotation Vector (GRV)
The GRV sensor measures the rotation of the device using the device’s magnetometer
and accelerometer; it returns a vector containing the angles that the device is rotated
in the x, y and z axes.
A.5 Global Positioning System (GPS)
The GPS sensor based a satellite-based global positioning and velocity measurement. A
latitude and longitude pair is returned, representing a geographical location on Earth.
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A.6 Gravity
The gravity sensor on mobile handsets measures the effect of Earth’s gravity on the
device, measured in metres per second per second (ms−2).
A.7 Gyroscope
The gyroscope measures the rate of rotation of the device about the x, y and z axes; its
units are radians per second (rads−1).
A.8 Relative Humidity
The relative humidity sensor returns the percentage of the relative ambient humidity in
the air.
A.9 Light
The light sensor measures the lighting conditions surrounding the mobile handset. An-
droid measures this quantity in lux.
A.10 Linear Acceleration
The linear acceleration sensor measures the affect of a device’s movement on itself; its
units are metres per second per second (ms−2).
A.11 Magnetic Field
The magnetic field sensor detects the Earth’s magnetic field along three perpendicular
axes x, y and z. Android measures these values in microteslas (µT ).
A.12 Network Location
A latitude and longitude pair is returned, representing a geographical location on Earth.
A.13 Pressure
The pressure sensor measures the atmospheric pressure surrounding the mobile handset.
It is measured in hectopascals (hPa).
A.14 Proximity
The proximity sensors detects distance, measured in centimetres. In many devices the
sensor returns only a boolean value, declaring whether something is in close proximity
to the device or not.
A.15 Rotation Vector
Rotation vector is a software sensor, similar to the GRV, but also incorporates the
gyroscope. The returned values represent the angles which the device has rotated through
the x, y and z axes.
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A.16 Sound
For the sound sensor’s measurement, we use the device’s microphone to record the noise
in the vicinity of the mobile handsets and retrieve the maximum amplitude that was
sampled, every time it becomes available by the Android operating system.
A.17 WiFi
This sensor uses traditional WiFi to detect the networks in the vicinity of the mobile
device. The MAC addresses and ESSIDs of the nearby networks are returned.
